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Citizenship and the European Union 
1. Introduction 
The idea and practice of European citizenship is relevant in two main ways 
to the recent controversy in Germany over plans by the governing Social-
Democratic Party to reform citizenship law. One of these is that the 
concepts of citizenship and nationality continue to be thought of as 
synonymous in Germany but are now relatively distinct, both linguistically 
and politically, in several other national regimes and in the European Union 
(EU). Secondly, on the one hand, new German provisions will be more 
similar than before to the nationality laws of other member states by 
introducing a right [as opposed to a discretionary possibility] to citizenship 
through residence and legal naturalization, as well as ancestry. But, on the 
other, the decision on 16 March 1999 to abandon the possibility of dual-
citizenship [or, in my language, nationality] means that, in this respect, the 
German approach to citizenship now runs counter to suggestions made by 
some specialists about the EU as a site of democratic practice. 
This paper will open with a brief discussion of the distinctiveness of 
citizenship and nationality. This is necessary so that one can understand the 
following section outlining EU provisions. In conclusion, this paper will 
discuss some of the arguments about the prospects for EU citizenship, with 
special reference to loosening the overlap between the legal label of 
national identity and the normative practice of citizenship. Elizabeth Meehan 
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2. Citizenship and Nationality 
As I have suggested elsewhere
1, there are good grounds for treating the 
overlap of citizenship and nationality as a matter of historical contingency 
and not as an analytically necessary connection. In short, nationality is a 
legal identity from which no rights need arise, though obligations might— 
as is obvious when nationals are called ‘subjects’. Conversely, citizenship 
is a practice, or a form of belonging, resting on a set of legal, social and 
participatory entitlements which may be conferred, and sometimes are, 
irrespective of nationality—or denied, as in the case of women and some 
religious and ethnic minorities, regardless of nationality. 
While borders had been porous in the Middle and Late-Middle Ages and 
migration normal, the strategic interests of new states lay in impregnability 
and control of persons with or without leave to cross frontiers. Nationality 
was an obvious criterion and proof of nationality a simple method of 
verification. The process of modernization in the new states went hand in 
hand with the construction of the nation. This served external and internal 
purposes. It created a sense of the ‘Otherness’ of those who were a threat to 
the strategic interests of political elites. And it fostered the loyalty or 
allegiance that induced willingness to be taxed to fund the defense of the 
state and to be enlisted into military service. Since 1945, allegiance is 
relevant less to military purposes than to the legitimacy of redistribution 
and the funding of welfare systems.
2 
The construction of the nation was promoted through the dismantling of 
feudal bonds and their replacement by a gradual extension of legal and 
political rights. So complete became the overlap between national identity 
and citizenship status that, in many political systems, even those with 
separate words, ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ became interchangeable. 
And, according to Raymond Aron, it was a contradiction in terms to see 
 
1 Meehan Elizabeth, Citizenship in the European Union, London: Sage 1993; 
Meehan, "European Integration and Citizens´ Rights: A Comparative Perspective", 
Publius. The Journal of Federalism 26 (4) Fall 1996. 
2 Miller, David, "In Defence of Nationality", Journal of Applied Philosophy 10, 1993, 
3-16. Citizenship and the European Union 
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citizenship rights as capable of being guaranteed by anything other than the 
state, more particularly the nation-state, and certainly not by a regime—the 
EU—that was not a state at all.
3 
But, using ‘citizenship’ as a synonym for ‘nationality’ can result in peculiar 
distortions of meaning. In late 19th century America, the Supreme Court 
ruled that a woman was, indeed, an American citizen but that being a 
citizen did not necessarily carry the right to vote. This empties the classical 
conception of ‘citizen’ of part of its core meaning and the ruling makes 
conceptual sense only if we substitute ‘national’ for ‘citizen’. In other 
systems, both terms are employed in legislation but as though ‘nationality 
and citizenship’ were all one word in which the first and last components 
were interchangeable. For example, except for one Article of the 1922 
Constitution, it was not until 1962 that Irish official documents began to be 
clear that there was a difference between citizenship as nationality and 
citizenship as the capacity to exercise rights. The current British passport 
still says ‘Nationality: British citizen’. 
However, from a longer historical perspective, we can see that citizenship 
is not the same as nationality but is about enabling people to participate in 
creating, maintaining and enjoying the good society, whether the people 
belonging to a society inhabit a citadel, a city-state, a locality, an empire, 
the world—and since John Stuart Mill and especially in Germany, the 
work-place. In the young United States of America, a century before the 
ruling just mentioned, and at the time of the making of the Constitution, 
there was no sense of an overarching American national identity and this 
did not evolve for a very long time. But there were citizenship rights, even 
if undemocratic by today’s standards, and the best way of protecting them 
was a passionate bone of contention between The Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists. More recently, a survey of eleven European countries shows no 
wholly systematic pattern of attaching nationality restrictions to legal and 
 
3  Aron, Raymond, "Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?", Social Research 41 (4), 
1974, pp. 638 –56. Elizabeth Meehan 
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social entitlements and rights to participate in politics.
4 For example, the 
British are aliens under Irish law but British nationals resident in Ireland 
now have most of the rights of citizenship. The Irish are neither alien nor 
British under United Kingdom (UK) law but, like resident Commonwealth 
nationals, have always been able to exercise all the rights of citizenship. In 
the EU, rules about who a state’s nationals are and how that nationality 
may be acquired or lost remain matters for national decision-making. For 
those who have been defined as nationals of member states, EU citizenship 
is about participation and the enjoyment of ‘the good society’ in the Union 
as a whole. As noted in conclusion, the European ‘good society’ is 
criticized as libertarian—offering private rights to individuals. But, it may 
be worth noting that the preambles to its directives on social policy often 
echo, if dimly, the classical conception of the ‘good society’ as a collective 
moral order of justice and conviviality.  
3. EU Citizenship  
Jacques Santer described the Treaty of Amsterdam as ‘set[ting] out the rules 
of the game Governments will have to observe’ and ‘establish[ing] rights for 
all the citizens’
5. Union citizenship, however, came into being formally in 
Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty [agreed in 1991, operational from 
November 1993]. As a personal status, it was confirmed in the Amsterdam 
Treaty which also consolidates and extends citizens’ and human rights—at 
least potentially.  
3.1 Rights Prior to Amsterdam 
The Maastricht Treaty went some way to acknowledging criticism that the 
EU did not recognize people as citizens because they were human beings but 
only as workers or providers of services who needed not to lose rights when  
 
 
4 Gardner, J.P.(ed.), Citizenship: The White Paper. London: The Institute for 
Citizenship 1997. 
5 European Commission, A New Treaty for Europe. Citizens´ Guide. Luxembourg 
1996, p.2. Citizenship and the European Union 
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moving. Under that Treaty, a citizen of the Union is anyone, worker or not, 
who is a national of a member state. The Treaty took another step towards a 
more universalistic justification for citizenship by referring to the relevance 
to the EU of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). It incorporated rights to information and redress within 
the common institutions, and required member states to agree upon 
arrangements for certain transnational political rights—the right of a national 
of any member state to be protected by the diplomatic and consular services 
of another state when outside the Union and the rights to vote and stand for 
office in municipal and European elections [not General Elections] wherever 
they reside within the union. Though citizenship is often considered an 
individualistic concept, it is notable that the Maastricht Treaty 
‘constitutionalized’ a channel for people collectively to influence common 
policies through the Committee of the Regions. Though this Committee is 
sometimes judged to be a piece of window dressing, the development of 
regions in Europe or, at least, ‘multi-level governance’ has been significant to 
the strengthening of demands in parts of the UK for greater ‘self-
determination’. I shall return to this in conclusion. 
Before the notion of citizen acquired a formal political status in the 
Maastricht Treaty, elements of common citizenship were already arising from 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome; that is, if we accept the view of its best known 
modern exponent, T. H. Marshall, that citizenship is only fully realized 
through an interlocking triad of civil, political and social rights. 
The goal of freedom of movement [Article 118 of the Treaty of Rome] is the 
foundation for some equivalents of traditional civil rights, since elucidated in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); for example, 
relating to residence, the administration of justice and ownership of 
immovable property—for economically active migrants within the 
Community. Almost from the outset, the ECJ established that the Treaty of 
Rome gave a common legal right to individual nationals, migrant or not. This 
was their right to expect, and duty to ensure, that states, including their own, 
complied with Community law (van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen, Case No 26/62, [1962] ECR 1). 
 Elizabeth Meehan 
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European social rights are not directly redistributive. Rather, the Community 
regulates entitlements [mainly for workers] in member states through legal 
principles, the most important of which is non-discrimination. The principle 
of freedom of movement gave rise to two Regulations outlawing nationality-
based discrimination against migrant workers’ access to insurance-based 
social benefits [revised as Regulation 1408/71] and against them and their 
families in other social assistance [revised as Regulation 1612/68]. Sex-based 
discrimination was made unlawful in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome 
which required equal pay for men and women doing the same work. Between 
1975 and the mid-1980s, five Directives followed which: widened the scope 
of equal pay; extended the right of equality into other conditions of 
employment; applied the principle to statutory and occupational social 
security schemes; and gave comparable entitlements to self-employed 
women. Another Directive, passed in 1992 under the Health and Safety 
Framework, protects pregnant women workers and guarantees levels of 
maternity pay and leave. Three others in the 1990s, arising from agreements 
concluded through ‘social dialogue’, cover parental leave and leave for 
family reasons, the burden of proof in cases of discrimination, and part-time 
work. 
Rights not based on the non-discrimination principle include: Directives in 
the 1980s on consultation over redundancy plans and protection of 
employment conditions when business is transferred to another undertaking; 
and others, stemming from the Single European Act of 1987, requiring 
consultation and protection in situations of risk and hazard at work. The 
latter, and others relating to the young and elderly, were introduced through 
the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 
Under the auspices of Social Dialogue and the Maastricht Treaty, further 
steps have been, or are being, taken with respect to working conditions [eg, 
working hours, part-time contracts] and workers’ rights of consultation in 
transnational companies, though the latter fall short of the high standards set Citizenship and the European Union 
9 
by the German co-determination model
6. These areas are also covered by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
3.2 The Treaty of Amsterdam 
The Treaty of Amsterdam does little to enhance transnational or 
supranational political rights. But is does contain a number of provisions 
relating to human rights and it reflects a growing realization amongst 
governments, particularly those recently holding the EU presidency, that the 
policy concerns of citizens need to be more systematically addressed.  
Prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, there was discussion of whether the EU itself 
would subscribe to the ECHR. No agreement on this could be found and a 
compromise worked out by the Irish Presidency in 1996 found its way into 
the final draft.
7 The Treaty, which was agreed upon in June 1997, amends the 
general principles of the Union, laid down in Maastricht, to focus upon 
‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law’ (Amended Article F of Maastricht). The amended Article 
affirms that rights specified in the European Convention will be respected as 
principles of Community law. A new paragraph in the Preamble adds 
confirmation of respect for the social rights of the 1961 European Social 
Charter [an addendum to the Convention] and the Community’s own 1989 
Charter.
8 A new Article 6a amends the Treaty of Rome to enable the EU to 
take action, if it wishes, ‘to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’
9 
In this connection, two changes in the UK are noteworthy as an indication of 
a greater willingness to play a more central role in European integration. 
Soon after winning the 1997 General Election, the new Labour Government 
announced that it would end the ‘opt-out’ from further EU social 
 
6 Elizabeth Meehan, Ireland´s Choice to Prioritize Free Movement with the United 
Kingdom over Free Movement in the European Union, Blue Paper, The Policy 
Institute, Trinity College Dublin (forthcoming).  
7 Insitute of European Affairs, IGC Updates, Nos 1-9, esp. no. 9 of 24.6.97, Institute 
of European Affairs, Dublin 1997. 
8 European Commission 1996, p.9. 
9 Ibid, p. 9. Elizabeth Meehan 
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developments that the previous government had secured in the Maastricht 
Treaty, thus enabling social policy to be brought into the main body of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Secondly, the government has introduced legislation to 
incorporate the ECHR into domestic law—welcomed as a ‘step in the right 
direction’, though also criticized for its limitations.
10 
The concrete provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty designed to buttress the 
principles noted above do not extend Maastricht’s primary political rights to 
General Elections. But the Treaty does introduce new legal and secondary 
political rights which could, depending on implementation, become 
significant. 
New legal and political protection includes: the entitlement of individuals to 
take EU institutions to the ECJ over any action which they think breaches 
their rights and new Articles [Fa in the Maastricht Treaty and 236 in the 
Rome Treaty] which enable the European Council to deal with a member 
state in ‘serious and persistent breach’ of the general principles of rights, 
including suspending its voting rights. 
The Amsterdam Treaty also covers the ability of citizens to influence or 
participate in Union policy. For example, a Protocol on subsidiarity,
11 while 
mostly about the respective responsibilities of states and common institutions 
stresses the need for consultation and a new Article adds openness to the need 
for decisions to be taken as closely as possible to the citizen.
12 Rights of 
access to the documents of the Commission, Council and Parliament are re-
affirmed
13 and the Council is obliged to make public the record of voting on 
legislation.
14 Communication with citizens should be in their own language  
 
 
 
10 Aziz, Adrienne, "Human Rights: Home at last but still found wanting", in: AUT 
Bulletin, No. 211, January 1999. 
11 European Commission, 1996, Chapter 9. 
12 Duff, Andrew (ed.), The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary. London: The 
Federal Trust and Sweet and Maxwell 1997, p.100-109. 
13 European Commission 1996, p. 94. 
14 Ibid, p. 7. Citizenship and the European Union 
11 
[new Article 8d, Maastricht].
15 Individuals are protected against the misuse of 
personal data [new Article 213b in the Treaty of Rome]. 
The Treaty aims to improve the capacities of peoples’ elected representatives 
to act on their behalf through more efficient arrangements for scrutiny of EU 
proposals by national parliaments (ibid, Chapter 19) and by the extension, 
and simplification, of the European Parliament’s co-decision-making powers 
vis a vis the Council of Ministers (ibid, Chapter 14). There are additional 
obligations on the European Parliament to consult the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions (ibid, Chapter 18). 
The civil right of freedom of movement is consolidated by the introduction of 
a new Title III (a) into the Treaty of Rome. This lifts controls on persons 
crossing borders between member states; aims to establish, over the next five 
years, common standards in respect to entry at external borders, visas, 
immigration and free movement for lawful residents who are nationals of 
third countries, refugees and asylum-seekers; and it deals with judicial co-
operation over civil matters. In effect, this will bring the Schengen acquis and 
much of the subject matter of the intergovernmental third pillar of Maastricht 
[now left with police and judicial co-operation over criminal matters] into the 
ambit of common policy initiation, with some role for the European Court of 
Justice.
16 Protocols allow derogations for Denmark, the UK and Ireland. All 
three may participate in proposed initiatives if they are seen as consistent 
with interests. The Danish position does not reflect opposition to the lifting of 
checks but arises from its insistence that ‘flanking’ measures dealing with 
immigration and co-operation should remain intergovernmental and be 
decided upon, finally, in national parliaments. The UK does resist the lifting 
of checks. Again, however, the outcome reflects something of a reorientation 
towards the EU. The previous government would have vetoed ‘the 
communitarization of Schengen’ but the new one took the view that it should 
not stand in the way of what other states wanted, on the condition that it 
could be exempt. The Irish negotiated similar exemptions in order to preserve 
 
15 European Commission 1996, p.76. 
16 Government of Ireland, Treaty of Amsterdam White Paper, Pn 4931, Dublin: The 
Stationary Office 1998, pp. 42-47, 54-67. Elizabeth Meehan 
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the Common Travel Area between it and the UK but made its distinctive 
position clear in the wording of the Protocols.
17 
Despite controversy prior to agreement over [un]employment and poverty, 
the Amsterdam Treaty extends its scope for action in the socio-economic 
sphere into two new chapters. One on employment does not intend to expand 
citizens’ rights but aims to coordinate national policies, under EU guidance 
and monitoring, so as to achieve ‘a high level of employment’ and ‘a skilled, 
trained and adaptable workforce’.
18 Rights at work, excluding pay and 
industrial disputes but including consultation over proposals with the ‘social 
partners’, are part of the subject of the chapter on social policy. This promises 
further directives to improve consultation, to reduce exclusion from the 
labour market [and, therefore, one source of poverty] and to make sex 
equality more real. In response to an unfavorable ruling on positive action in 
the ECJ (Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, ECJ [1995] Case C-450/93), 
the chapter explicitly authorizes measures ‘to make it easier for the 
underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages in professional careers’. Action is promised—
though mostly subject unanimous voting—on social security, conditions 
when contracts are terminated, worker participation in company policy, 
employment conditions for ‘third country’ nationals, and job creation. 
Other conditions which affect the lives of citizens are also covered. Proposed 
actions include: harmonized and national measures to reduce environmental 
risks in general and at work, including impact assessments of all policies; the 
overcoming of major health scourges and attention to the health implications 
of all other policies; and consumer protection. 
4. Assessments of EU Citizenship and its Prospects 
Assessments of EU citizenship and its prospects are contradictory, possibly 
being determined by divergent general ideological and epistemological 
 
17 Meehan, Elizabeth, Ireland´s Choice, ibid. 
18 Duff, Andrew, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary, London: Federal 
Trust and Sweet and Maxwell 1997, pp. 59-65. Citizenship and the European Union 
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outlooks. Sometimes, they seem guided by whether the commentator favors 
or opposes European integration (Meehan, 1996). Sometimes, they seem to 
depend on whether the analyst is a positivist who examines only what exists 
concretely and compares its slightness to national provisions—but 
overlooking the contrast between decades and centuries of evolution in the 
EU and national systems respectively (Meehan, 1993). Conversely, other 
analysts suggest that what is important is not the size but the dynamics of 
change; that is, the fact that established norms have been breached at all 
opens the possibility, though not the inevitability, of new paradigms. 
The oldest criticism of EU citizenship starts from the limitations of the Treaty 
of Rome as a basis for rights. These being restricted to the freedom of 
movement of goods, capital, labor and services mean that European rights 
were restricted to the ‘citizen-as-worker’ instead of reflecting the normative 
principle that people are citizens because they are human beings. This makes 
it particularly defective for women and all those not in regular, conventional 
employment. Also, although ECJ jurisprudence tended to expand the scope of 
rights and to limit anomalies within and across states, at least until the 1980s, 
the legal instruments and enforcement procedures can make it difficult to 
realize rights that are, in practice, common across the Community. It is also 
argued that the evolution of European citizenship replicates in a larger arena 
the physical and social exclusion of people without the right nationality. 
[‘Third country’ migrants within the Community, however, do have some 
protection under the original Treaty of Rome, if they are members of a 
migrant EU family or as a result of agreements between the Community and 
third countries.] 
Concerns about the narrowness of rights began to be acknowledged in the 
mid-1970s, grew with the momentum of discussion of an ‘ever closer union’ 
in the 1980s, and were reflected in the Maastricht Treaty. Though there are 
positive assessments of Maastricht and prior developments, the 1991 Treaty 
has been criticized for not going far enough. 
All critics note that the status and, hence, rights of EU citizens continue to 
rest upon nationality of a member state and that this remains a prerogative of 
member state governments—though recently, the UK government was taken  
 Elizabeth Meehan 
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to task for denying the right to vote in European elections to Gibraltarians 
[British Protected Persons, until full nationality was restored to colonial 
citizens earlier this year]. They also note the exclusion of General Elections 
and potential derogations from provisions for municipal and European 
elections. These are possible where there are specific problems, especially 
questions of national identities, as in Luxembourg where the proportion of 
residents from other member states is larger than elsewhere.
19 O’Leary
20 
argues that: the pre-existing direct link [van Gend en Loos—see above] 
between individuals and the centre is slight, a view reinforced by a German 
ruling about the 1991 Treaty [Manfred Brunner and others v. The European 
Union Treaty , Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92 [1994] 1 CMLR 57];
21 the 
new voting rights are little more than reciprocal arrangements which could 
exist, and sometimes do, irrespective of union; and that it will be difficult in 
practice to use the right to diplomatic and consular protection by other 
member states. Curtin and Meijers
22 identify hypocrisy on the part of member 
state governments, except Denmark and the Netherlands, in their ostensible 
intention to enhance rights to information. Member states’ restrictive 
applications of these measures to information about border policies reinforce 
at a European level the ‘closure’ effects of citizenship on people from 
outside.
23 In the social field, the Commission’s capacity to expand a 
regulatory regime of rights is restricted to what it may opportunistically  
 
 
19 Closa, Carlos, "Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States", in 
Common Market Law Review, no. 32, 1995, pp.487-518. 
20 O´Leary, Siofra, "The Relationship between Community Citizenship and the 
Fundamental Rights in Community Law", in: Common Market Law Review, no. 
32, 1995, pp.519-544. 
21 See also Harmsen, Robert, Integration as Adaption: National Courts and the Politics of 
Community Law, Paper presented at the Annual Conference of Political Studies 
Association of Ireland 1994. 
22 Curtin, Deirdre; Meijers, Herman, "The Principle of Open Government in Schengen 
and the EU: Democratice Retrogression", in: Common Market Law Review no. 32 
1995, pp. 391- 442. 
23 See also Kostakopoulou, Dora, "Is there an Alternative for Schengenland ?", in 
Political Studies, no. 46 (4), 1998, pp.886-902. Citizenship and the European Union 
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introduce in a context of a reluctant Council of Ministers.
24 Critics of 
Maastricht also stress the limitations of local partnership, regional 
subsidiarity and the status, powers and budget of the Committee of the 
Regions. Such criticisms would need to be met if the Amsterdam Treaty is, 
indeed, to live up to its promise outlined by Jacques Santer. 
So far there has been a cautious welcome for the Amsterdam Treaty. Positive 
views (eg, Oreja, 18.6.97; IEA, 24.6.97) have been expressed about: the 
adoption of strong normative principles of rights; the new basis for 
combatting more forms of discrimination; the procedures for dealing with 
infringements of rights; the inclusion of the Employment Chapter; the 
references to reducing exclusion; and the proposal to set standards for ‘third 
country’ nationals at work and in free movement. The Treaty’s references to 
national and Union representative bodies goes a little way towards 
Chryssochoou’s insistence that ‘democratic deficits’ need to be addressed on 
both planes if the experience of citizenship is to be realized in full.
25 On the 
other hand, the Commission itself reflects some of the concerns of voluntary 
organisations by regretting the limitations of social policy. It also notes that 
‘the institutional system is not yet entirely equal to the challenges’ and regrets 
the opaqueness of the Treaty’s text (Oreja, 18.6.97). Moreover, ‘under many 
... headings, ... the provisions may be criticized as being general rather than 
specific and aspirational rather than tangible’ (Institute of European Affairs, 
24.6.97). 
But, as a foil to criticisms of the limitations of Maastricht, there is an 
alternative assessment of EU developments which can be applied equally to 
Amsterdam. For example, Weiner argues that citizenship, including ‘access’ 
and ‘belonging’ as well as rights, has never been static or uniform. She 
identifies in the history of integration confluences of policy imperatives and  
 
 
24 Mazey, Sonia, "The Development of EU Policies: Bureaucratic Expansion on 
Behalf of Women ?", in Public Administration no. 73 (4) 1996, pp.591-609. 
25 Chryssochoou, Dimitris, "Democratic Theory and European Integration: the 
Challenge of Conceptual Innovation", in Smith, Hazel (ed.), New Thinking in 
Politics and International Relations, Canterbury 1996, pp. 20-33. Elizabeth Meehan 
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the interests of key political actors which have created breaches in nation-
state experiences of citizenship and opportunities for new paradigms and 
practices.
26 
In her account, the regulation of social rights and relations between 
Community institutions and the ‘social’, local and regional ‘partners’ [pre-
dating Maastricht] are part of ‘access’ and ‘belonging’. The period of 
acceleration towards union is, in Weiner’s account, a time of discernible 
movement in the paradigm of citizenship, containing the seeds of new 
practice in the activation of rights. In particular, markets and migration make 
‘place’, as well as nationality, the conceptual and practical pre-condition for 
triggering legal, political and social entitlements. This could become 
significant not only for nationals of member states but also for lawfully 
resident ‘third country’ migrants, as seems to be beginning in Amsterdam. 
Even if early reactions to the Amsterdam Treaty are guarded, the movement 
reflected in it seems to vindicate O’Keefe’s view that ‘[t]he importance of the 
TEU [Maastricht] citizenship provisions lies not in their content but rather in 
the promise they hold out for the future. The concept is a dynamic one, 
capable of being added to or strengthened but not diminished’.
27 The same 
can be said, in turn, about Amsterdam. Moreover, the EU’s ability to sustain 
its dual claim of being ‘for its citizens’ while also ‘respect[ing] the national 
identities of its Member States’ depends upon such dynamism.
28 
All stories of rights, however, depend on what people make of them. If they 
are to result in real redistribution of power or influence, much depends on the 
ability of civil society ‘to seize the day’. Closa sees more potential, in 
principle, in supranational than national arenas for democratic citizenship. In 
practice, he suggests however, that European civil society may be too fragile 
to transform EU citizenship into an arena for democratic self-determination 
 
26 Weiner, Antje, Building Institutions: The Developing Practice of European 
Citizenship, Ottawa: PhD Thesis, Carleton University 1995. 
27 Chryssochoou, p. 30. 
28 European Commission, 1997, p.5. Citizenship and the European Union 
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from what he calls an enhanced set of private rights to make the most of new 
market opportunities [or be sheltered a little from its threats].
29 
His argument rests on a critique of the case that a shared national identity is a 
pre-condition for citizenship. For, by insisting that citizenship can be built 
only on such bonds, such theories propose that a democratic practice be based 
on a commonality that was formed under pre-democratic conditions. In 
contrast, a site of democratic citizenship is one in which people live together 
under a set of principled bonds, such as those identified by Robert Dahl as 
voting equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control of 
agendas and inclusiveness. In drawing this contrast, Closa suggests that 
supranational citizenship is less vulnerable than national citizenship to 
charges of exclusion and discrimination because, being unable to draw on 
comparable non-principled bonds, its success must depend on democratic and 
human rights norms. 
Dahl, of course, is a citizen of that country which I mentioned earlier where 
democratic norms and ties [albeit defective] preceded national bonding. In 
contrast, Britishness was forged by elites, prior to democracy, to make bonds 
between peoples who had been enemies of one another. It worked for some 
centuries, in the context of different sub-state national identities, as principled 
bonds were grafted on to the pre-democratic unifications. But the fragility of 
the origins is re-emerging and there are claims, at least in Scotland, and to 
some extent, Wales, which support Closa’s case; that is, that, from a 
democratic basis, a new union of principled norms can be negotiated at the 
supranational level—the EU. 
The idea that a multi-state supranational union may be preferable to union 
with a single neighbour arises from experience among the component peoples 
of the UK in trying to make what Closa calls their private EU rights have 
public consequences. That is, people—not only nationalists but also 
 
29 Closa, Carlos, "European Citizenship, Mulitculturalism, and the State", in Ulrich 
Preuss/Ferran Requejo (eds.), European Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and the 
State, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges. 1998; Closa, "Supranational Citizenship 
and Democracy: Normative and empirical Dimensions", in: M. Torre (ed.), 
European Citizenship: An International Challenge, Kluver Law International 1998. Elizabeth Meehan 
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advocates for their regions—whose material interests are enhanced by 
learning to use EU partnership opportunities are trying to redefine their 
relationship to the domestic state in a European context, to bring about new 
forms of mobilization and interaction, and to influence agendas. But, again in 
line with Closa’s theoretical case, unification into the British state left civil 
society institutions intact, especially in Scotland and Northern Ireland and, 
hence, in a position to try either to improve the principled bonds of the 
British state or to negotiate new ones in a different arena. 
Closa  is guarded about whether there is a strong enough civil society in the 
EU to transcend the defects of national citizenship in order to bring about the 
benefits of a regime based on principled bonds—without a willingness on the 
part of states themselves to agree to stop trying to maintain the impression 
that anxieties about national identities are well attended to in EU provisions. 
The changes which he suggests are necessary and include the avoidance of 
derogations and exemptions which ‘offer shelter to communitarian 
understandings of the relationship between individuals and the state 
premissed on nationality’; ‘the full constitutionalization of a European 
political status’; greater opportunities for direct citizenship participation in 
EU affairs; stronger commonality and reciprocity of rights in different 
member states; and willingness by states to respond to ‘spill-over’ pressures 
from EU citizenship status on to varying nationality laws, including greater 
willingness to acknowledge dual or multi-nationality.
30 Something of the last 
is beginning to happen. Some ‘spill-over’ can be seen in Germany’s intention 
to proceed with allowing citizenship through naturalization as well as 
ancestry, if not in its abandonment of making dual-citizenship legal. The ECJ 
is playing a role. The UK and Gibraltarians was mentioned above. Another 
case was about a person with dual-nationality—of a member state and a third 
country. The ECJ rejected another member state’s claim to be free to 
recognise only the third country dimension and, hence, to deny rights. 
If Closa is right about the weakness of European civil society, as a whole, in 
combatting a privatized, liberal or libertarian conception of citizenship, then  
 
 
30 Closa, Carlos, ibid. Citizenship and the European Union 
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enlargement may reinforce the challenge. The prospective member states, 
while having to subscribe to principles of liberty, democracy and human 
rights as a condition of entry are not well placed to do so in practice—
emerging as they are from totalitarianism which suppressed civil society or 
bent it to the will of the state. At a conference during the 1998 UK 
presidency, harrowing tales were told of the vulnerability of emergent civil 
society associations in the Balkans and of discrimination against minorities in 
east and east-central Europe. With or without minority problems, the concept 
of liberty—perhaps necessitated by dire economic conditions—is, even more 
libertarian than that which Closa sees in the EU. It is the negative one of 
‘freedom from’ restraint—not the ‘freedom to’ which is implicit in Christian- 
and social-democracy and still has some place in the link in the EU model 
between social inclusion and economic progress. The point to be drawn here 
is not about the addition of more nationalities, either per se or in their further 
reduction of the overlap between nationality and citizenship. It is that 
growing mismatches amongst sets of principled bonds, not a more complex 
collection of pre-democratic identifications, may inhibit the transformation of 
EU citizenship along the lines aspired to by Closa. Elizabeth Meehan 
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